The Forms of Capital

Pierre Bourdieu

maximize monetary profit cannot be defined as such without producing the purposeless
totality of cultural or artistic practices and their products; the world of bourgeois man,
with his double-entry accounting, cannot be invented without producing the pure, perfect
universe of the artist and the intellectual and the gratuitous activities of art-for-art's sake
and pure theory. In other words, the constitution of a science of mercantile relations
which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to ana-
lyze—private property, profit, wage labor, etc.—is not even a science of the field of eco-

demic production, has prevented the constitutio

The reader should not be misled b
somewhat peremptory air which the eff
axiomization may give to my argument.

capital.

From J. E. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education

Cultural Capital

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-la
dispositions of the mind and body; the objectified state, in the form of cultural prod-
ucts (pictures, books, dictionaries, instrum-

tions, and at the cost of the more or less ex-

Inventions of social obli-

without economic interest as their principle and only with goods
that are directly and immediately convertible

to number (which makes them quantifiable),

itself and present itself as a realm of disinter-

and the extreme difficulty

certainty hypothesis which made it possi

which it is presumed to guarantee.

of money in a short space of time, and

with changing one’s social status

and in the which the win-

of the spin of the wheel can be

ables them to repro

institutions of capital, and

ual capital may be

class fractions can obtain a form of educational qualifications; an

social capital, made up of social obli-

connection which is

set apart because, as will be seen in the e

economic capital, which is

of the class or group to which

ditions, into economic capital

throughout the entire econo-

of the education of children origi-

which economic power, such as wealth and status, can be

and this is

with the presupposi-

academic success, i.e

of the academic or

of the distribution of cultural capital

inequality is

the academic market, to the distri-

the other hand, the level of education

and in human capital theories. Econo-

might seem to deserve credit for expl

ewald, or in relation to educational ac-

Economists have long been

noTABLE for its efficiency in the field in quas

capital can present itself in three fundam-

guises: as economic capital, which is imma-

and directly convertible into mone-

may be institutionalized in the form of estate rights; as cultural capital, which is

verifiable, on certain conditions, into econ-

and such class fractions can obtain a form of educational qualifications; an

social capital, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is verifiable, in

in economic capital

the reader should not be misled by a

disposition of the mind and body; it

in the form of cultural products (pictures, books, dictionaries, instrumen-

tions, and at the cost of the more or less ex-

The reader should not be misled by a

somewhat peremptory air which the eff

axiomization may give to my argument.

notion of cultural capital initially press

itself to me, in the course of research, a

theoretical hypothesis which made it possi-

the unequal scholastic achievement of

children originating from the different
classes by relating academic success, i.e.

specific profits which children from the
different classes and class fractions can

the academic market, to the distribu-

tional capital between the classes and fractions. This starting point implies a

with the presuppositions inherent to both the commonsense view, which sees academic

success or failure as an effect of natural apti-

and finality of cultural or artistic practices and their products; the world of bourgeois man,

with his double-entry accounting, cannot be invented without producing the pure, perfect

universe of the artist and the intellectual and the gratuitous activities of art-for-art's sake

and pure theory. In other words, the constitution of a science of mercantile relations

which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to ana-

lyze—private property, profit, wage labor, etc.—is not even a science of the field of eco-

nomic production, has prevented the constitutio

of the general science of the economy of practices, which would treat mercantile

exchange as a particular case of exchange in all its forms.

It is remarkable that the practices and assets thus salvaged from the 'icy water of egotistical
calculation' (and from science) are the virtual monopoly of the dominant class—as if

 economism had been able to reduce every-

thing to economics only because the reduction on which that discipline is based protects from

lucrational reduction everything which needs to be protected. If economics deals only with

practices that have narrowly economic interest as their principle and only with goods

that are directly and immediately convertible

into money (which makes them quantifiable),

then the universe of bourgeois production and exchange becomes an exception and can see

itself and present itself as a realm of disinter-

stedness. As everyone knows, priceless

things have their price, and the extreme difficulty

of converting certain practices and cer-

tain objects into money is only due to the fact

that this conversion is refused in the very

intention that produces them, which is

nothing other than the denial (Verneinung) of

the economy. A general science of the economy of practices, capable of reappropriating the

practices which, although objectively economic, are not and cannot be

socially recognized as economic, and which can be performed only at the cost of a whole

labor of dissimulation or, more precisely,

euphemization, must endeavor to grasp capital

and profit in all their forms and to establish the

laws whereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts to the same thing)

change into one another.

Depending on the field in which it func-

investment and on economic investment (and i.e., evolution). But their measurement of the aid from scholastic investment takes count only of monetary investments and yields, or those directly convertible into oney, such as the costs of schooling and the sh equivalent of time devoted to study; they are unable to explain the different proportions of their resources which different agents or different social classes allocate to economic investment and cultural investment because they fail to take systematic account of the structure of the differential chances of profit high the various markets offer these agents or classes as a function of the volume and the composition of their assets (see esp. Becker 1964b). Furthermore, because they neglect to state scholastic investment strategies to the whole set of educational strategies and to the system of reproduction strategies, they trivially, by a necessary paradox, lead to the est hidden and socially most determinant educational investment, namely, the domestic transmission of cultural capital. Their studies of the relationship between academic ability and academic investment show that they are aware that ability or talent is itself the product of an investment of time and cultural capital (Becker 1964a: 63-6). Not surprisingly, when endeavoring to evaluate the profits of scholastic investment, they can only consider the profitability of educational expenditure or society as a whole, the 'social rate of return,' or the 'social gain of education as measured by its effects on national productivity' (Becker 1964b: 121, 155). This typically functionalist definition of the functions of education ignores the contribution which the educational system makes to the reproduction of the social structure by sanctioning the hereditary transmission of cultural capital. From the very beginning, a definition of human capital, despite its humanistic connotations, does not move beyond economism and ignores, inter alia, the fact that the scholastic yield from educational action depends on the cultural capital previously invested by the family. Moreover, the economic and social yield of the educational qualification depends on the social capital, again inherited, which can be used to back it up.

THE EMBODIED STATE
Most of the properties of cultural capital can be deduced from the fact that, in its funda-

mental state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment. The accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of what is called culture, cultivation, Bildung, presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation, which, insofar as it implies a labor of incorporation and a labor of socialization which must be invested personally by the investor. Like the acquisition of a muscular physique or a suntan, it cannot be done at second hand (so that all effects of delegation are ruled out).

The work of acquisition is work on oneself (self-improvement), an effort that presupposes a personal cost (on paise de sa personne, as we say in French), an investment, above all of time, but also of that socially constituted form of libido, libido scolastica, with all the privation, renunciation, and so on that it may entail. It follows that the least inexact of all the measurements of cultural capital are those which take as their standard the length of acquisition—so long, of course, as this is not reduced to length of schooling and allowance is made for early domestic education by giving it a positive value (a gain in time, a head start) or a negative value (wasted time, and doubly so because more time must be spent correcting its effects), according to its distance from the demands of the scholastic market.

This embodied capital, external wealth converted into an integral part of the person, into a habitus, cannot be transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, property rights, or even titles of nobility) by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange. It follows that the use or exploitation of cultural capital presents particular problems for the holders of economic or political capital, whether they be private patrons or, at the other extreme, entrepreneurs employing executives endowed with a spot, time, time of cultural competence (not to mention the new state patrons). How can this capital, so closely linked to the person, be bought without buying the person and so losing the very effect of legitimation which presupposes the dissimulation of dependence? How can this capital be concentrated—as some undertakings demand—without concentrating those who are the possessors of the capital, which can have all sorts of unwanted consequences?

Cultural capital can be acquired, to a varying extent, depending on the period, the social group, and the social class, in the absence of any deliberate inculcation, and therefore quite unconsciously. It always remains marked by its earliest conditions of acquisition which, through the more or less visible marks they leave (such as the pronouncements characteristic of a class or region), help to determine its distinctive value. It cannot be accumulated beyond the appropriating capacities of an individual, it declines and dies with the investor (with his biological capacity, his memory, etc.). Because it is thus linked in numerous ways to the person in his biological singularity and is subject to a hereditary transmission which is always heavily disguised, or even invisible, it defies the old, deep-rooted distinction the Greek jurists made between inherited properties (ta patrota) and acquired properties (epiteta), i.e., those which an individual adds to his heritage. It thus manages to combine the prestige of innate property and the prestige of acquisition. Because the social conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more disguised than those of economic capital, it is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, i.e., to be unrecognizable as capital and recognized as legitimate competence, as authority exerting an effect of (mis)recognition, e.g., in the marital market and in all markets in which economic capital is not fully recognized, whether in matters of culture, with the great art collections or great cultural foundations, or in social welfare, with the economy of generosity and the gift. Furthermore, the specifically symbolic logic of distinction additionally secures material and symbolic profits for the possessors of a large cultural capital: any given cultural competence (e.g., being able to read in a world of illiterates) derives a scarcity value from its position in the distribution of cultural capital and yields profits of distinction for its owner. In other words, the share in profits which scarce cultural capital secures in class-divided societies is based, in the last analysis, on the fact that all agents do not have the economic and cultural means for prolonging their children's education beyond the minimum necessary for the reproduction of the labor-power least valorized at a given moment.

Thus the capital, in the sense of the means of appropriating the product of accumulated labor in the objectified state which is held by a given agent, depends for its real efficacy on the form of the distribution of the means of appropriation of industrial and objectively available resources; and the relationship of appropriation between an agent a resources objectively available, and his profits they produce, is mediated by relationship of objective and/or subjective petition between himself and the possessors of capital competing for it, goods, in which scarcity—and the social value—is generated. The structure of the field, i.e., the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital, i.e., the appropriation of profits power to impose the laws of function field most favourable to capital and its function.

But the most powerful principle of symbolic efficacy of cultural capital lies in the logic of its transmission. On the one hand, the process of appropriating ob capital in its natural and necessary form will take place mainly depend on the cultural embodied in the whole family (among other things) the generalizes effect and all forms of implicit transmission. On the other hand, the initial accumulation cultural capital, the precondition for easy accumulation of every kind of cultural capital, starts at the outset, delay, without wasted time, only for spring of families endowed with cultural capital; in this case, the period covers the whole period of a person's education. It follows that the transmission cultural capital is no doubt the best kind of hereditary transmission of capital therefore receives proportionately weight in the system of reproduction, as the direct, visible forms of tension tend to be more strongly censused.

It can immediately be seen that between economic and cultural capital is established through the mediation of needed for acquisition. Differences in cultural capital possessed by the family it enters first into the age at which the transmission and accumulation begin limiting case being full use of the temporally available, with the maximum being harnessed to maximum cultural—and then in the capacity, thus does satisfy the specifically cultural demand for prolonged process of acquisition. Material means with this, t of time for which a given individual long his acquisition process depend.
h of time for which his family can provide with the free time, i.e., time free from ominous necessity, which is the precondition for initial accumulation (time which can be (50)


Social capital is the aggregate of the ac potential resources which are linked to sessions of durable network of more institutionalized relationships of acquaintance and recognition—or in words, to membership in a group—provides each of its members with the benefit of the collectivity-ownd capital, a "collective" which entitles them to credit, in favorable sense of the word. These relate may exist only in the practical state, initial and/or symbolic exchanges which I maintain them. They may also be instituted and guaranteed by the appeal of a common name (the name of a fa class, a tribe or of a school, a party, etc. by a whole set of instituting acts simultaneously to form and inform the over time; in this case, they are less really enacted and so maintained an enforced, in exchanges. Being based on utility material and symbolic exchange establishment and maintenance of symbolic relations, they suppose reacknowledgment of proportions; they are also partially irreducible to obligations of proximity in physical (geo) universal space or even in economic space.

The volume of the social capital pos by a given agent thus depends on the size network of connections he can mobilize on and the volume of the capital in economic, cultural or symbolic) possesses own right by each of those to whom he (f) This means that, although it is irreducible to the economic and capital possessed by a given agent, or the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, social capital is never completely independent of it because the exchange trusting mutual acknowledgment pres reacknowledgment of a min objective homogeneity, and because its multiplier effect on the capital he posse his own right.

The process which accrue from mship in a group are the basis of the social capital which makes them possible.
The Forms of Capital

plied in concentration and to secure the
profits—material, symbolic, or those derived from association with a
reputation, in the case of the

whole group, by the genealogical definition of
ship relations, which is the characteristic of
social formation. It is the product of an end-
ess effort at institution, of which institution is
often wrongly described as rites of pas-
g—mark the essential moments and which
necessary in order to produce and repro-
duce lasting, useful relationships that can
cure material or symbolic profits (see Bour-
cu 1982). In other words, the network of
relationships is the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, con-
iously or unconsciously aimed at establish-
g or reproducing social relationships that
c directly usable in the short or long term,
... transforming contingent relations, as
those of neighborhood, the workplace,
kinship, into relationships that are at
ce necessary and elective, implying durable
relations subjectively felt (feelings of grati-
dec, respect, friendship, etc.) or institution-
ally guaranteed (rights). This is done through
the alchemy of consecration, the symbolic con-
titution produced by social institution (institu-
tion as a relative—brother, sister, cousin,
et al. or as a knight, an heir, an elder, etc.) and
mentally reproduced in and through the change of (gifts, words, women, etc.) which
encourages and which presupposes and pro-
ces mutual knowledge and recognition.
This exchange transforms the things exchanged
signs of recognition and, through the
utal recognition and the recognition of
ship membership which it implies, re-
produces the group. By the same token,
affirms the limits of the group, i.e., the
beyond which the constitutive exchange—
ade, commensality, or marriage—cannot
place. Each member of the group is thus
stituted as a custodian of the limits of the
group; because the definition of the criteria of
in is at stake in each new entry, he can mod-
er the group by the limits of legitimate
exchange through some form of isaliance. It is quite logical that, in most
societies, the preparation and conclusion of
marriages should be the business of the whole
group, and not of the agents directly con-
cerned. Through the introduction of new
members into a family, a clan, or a club, the
whole definition of the group, i.e., its lines, its
boundaries, and its identity, is put at stake,
exposed to redefinition, alteration, adulation.
When, as in modern societies, families
lose the monopoly of the establishment of
exchanges which can lead to lasting relation-
ships, whether socially sanctioned (like mar-
riage) or not, they may continue to control
these exchanges, while remaining within the
logic of laissez-faire, through all the institu-
tions which are designed to favor legitimate
exchanges and exclude illegitimate ones by
producing occasions (rallies, cruises, hunts,
parties, receptions, etc.), places (smart neigh-
borhoods, select schools, clubs, etc.), or prac-
tices (smart sports, parlor games, cultural
ceremonies, etc.) which bring together, in a
seemingly fortuitous way, individuals as
homogeneous as possible in all the pertinent
respects in terms of the existence and persis-
tence of the group.

The reproduction of social capital presup-
poses an unceasing effort of sociability, a
continuous series of exchanges in which
recognition is endlessly affirmed and re-
ited. This work, which implies expendi-
ture of time and energy and so, directly or
indirectly, of economic capital, is not pro-
table or even conceivable unless one invests in
it a specific competence (knowledge of
geographical relationships and of real connec-
tions and skill at using them, etc.) and an
acquired disposition to acquire and maintain
this competence, which are themselves integral
parts of this capital. This is one of the
factors which explain why the profitability of
this labor of accumulating and maintaining
social capital rises in proportion to the size of
the capital. Because the social capital accruing
from a relationship is that much greater to the
extent that the person who is the object of it is
richly endowed with capital (mainly social,
but also cultural and even economic capital),
the possessors of an inherited social capital,
symbolized by a great name, are able to trans-
form all circumstantial relationships into last-
ing connections. They are sought after for
their social capital and, because they are well
known, are worthy of being known ('I know
him well'); they do not need to 'make the
acquaintance' of all their 'acquaintances'; they
are known to more people than they know, and
their work of sociability, when it is exerted, is
highly productive.

Every group has its more or less institu-
tionalized forms of delegation which enable it
to consolidate the totality of the social capital,
which is the sum of the existence of the group
(a family or a nation, of course, but also an
association or a party), in the hands of a single
agent or a small group of agents and to man-
date this plenipotentiary, charged with plena
potestas agentis et loquendi, to represent the
group, to speak and act in its name and so, with
the aid of this collectively owned capital, to
exercise a power incommensurate with the
agent's personal contribution. Thus, at the
most elementary degree of institutionaliza-
tion, the head of the family, the pater familias,
the eldest, most senior member, is tacitly rec-
nounced as the only person entitled to speak on
behalf of the family group in all official cir-
cumstances. But whereas in this case, diffus
delegation requires the great to step forward
and defend the collective honor when the
honor of the weakest members is threatened,
the institutionalized delegation, which
ensures the concentration of social capital,
also has the effect of limiting the consequences
of individual lapses by explicitly delimiting
responsibilities and authorizing the recogn-
ized spokesmen to shield the group as a whole
from discredit by expelling or excom-
cunicating the embarrassing individuals.

If the internal competition for the monop-
y of legitimate representation of the group is
not to threaten the conservation and accumu-
lation of the capital which is the basis of the
group, the members of the group must regu-
late the conditions of access to the right to
be oneself a member of the group and, abov
all, to set oneself up as a representative (delega-
tee, plenipotentiary, spokesman, etc.) of
the group, thereby committing the social
capital of the whole group. The title of
nobility is the form pellelence of the insti-
tutionalized social capital which guarantees a
particular form of social relationship in a last-
ing way. One of the paradoxes of delegation is
that the mandated agent can exert on (and, up
to a point, against) the group the power which
the group enables him to concentrate. (This is
perhaps especially true in the limiting cases in
which the mandated agent creates the group
which creates him but which only exists
through him.) The mechanisms of dc and
representation (in both the literal and
the legal senses) which fall into play much
more strongly, no doubt, when a
larger and its members weak-
ning the conditions for the concen-
trate social capital (among other reasons, it
enables numerous, varied, scattered agents
as a single and to overcome the limit
of space and time) also contain the set
emblem of misappropriation capital
which they assemble.

This emblem is latent in the
a group as a whole can be repre-
vies of various meanings of the word, by a
picture clearly delimited and perfectly vis-
known to all, and recognized by all, th
nobiles, the 'people who are known', t

dign of whom is the nobility, and v
speak on behalf of the whole group, is
the whole group and exercise a
in the name of the whole group. The
group personified. He bears the
of the group to which he gives his na
nymonomy which links the noble to h
clearly seen when Shakespeare calls
'Egypt' or the King of France 'Fra
Racine calls Pyrrhus 'Epirus'). It is
is name, the difference it proclaims,
ners of his group, the lieuten-
and, the land and castles, are known an-
nized. Similarly, phenomena such as
sonality cult' or the identification of
trade unions, or movements with the
are latent in the very logic of repres.
Everything combines to cause the sig
take the place of the signified, the sp
that of the group he is supposed to ex
least because his distinction, his 'out-
ness', his visibility constitute the
part, if not the essence, of this power
being entirely set within the logic of
dge and acknowledgment, is fundam-
able power; but also because the
ative, the sign, the emblem, may
create, the whole reality of group
receive effective social existence only
through representation.17

Conversions

The different types of capital can be
from economic capital, but only at
the more or less great effort of transfi
which is needed to produce the type of power effective in the field in question. For example, there are some goods and services to which economic capital gives immediate access, while others cannot: others can be obtained only by virtue of a social capital of relationships (or social obligations) which cannot act instantaneously, at the appropriate moment, unless they have been established and maintained for a long time, as if for their own sake, and therefore outside their period of use, i.e., at the cost of an investment in sociability which is necessarily long-term because the time lag is one of the factors of the transformation of a pure and simple debt into that recognition of non-specific indebtedness which is called gratitude. In contrast to the cynical but also economical transparency of economic exchange, in which equivalents change hands in the same instant, the essential ambiguity of social exchange, which presupposes misrecognition, in other words, a form of faith and of bad faith (in the sense of self-deception), presupposes a much more subtle economy of time.

So it has to be posited simultaneously that economic capital is at the root of all the other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms of economic capital, never entirely reducible to that definition, produce their most specific effects only to the extent that they conceal (not least from their possessors) the fact that economic capital is at their root, in other words—but only in the last analysis—at the root of their effects. The real logic of the functioning of capital, the conversions from one type to another, and the law of conservation which governs them cannot be understood under two opposing but equally partial views but superseded: on the one hand, economism, which, on the grounds that every type of capital is reducible in the last analysis to economic capital, ignores what makes the specific efficacy of the other types of capital, and on the other hand, semiosis (nowadays represented by structuralism, symbolic interactionism, or ethnomethodology), which reduces social exchanges to phenomena of communication and ignores the brutal fact of unequal reducibility to economics.

In accordance with a principle which is the equivalent of the principle of the conservation of energy, profits in one area are necessarily paid for by costs in another (so that a concept like waste has no meaning in a general science of the economy of practices). The universal equivalent, the measure of all equivalences, is nothing other than labor-time (in the widest sense); and the conservation of social energy through its conversions is verified, in each case, one takes into account both the labor-time accumulated in the form of capital and the labor-time needed to transform it from one type into another.

It has been seen, for example, that the transformation of economic capital into social capital presupposes a specific labor, i.e., an apparently gratuitous expenditure of time, attention, care, concern, which, as is seen in the endeavor to personalize a gift, has the effect of transforming the monetary import of the exchange and, by these tokens, the very meaning of the exchange. From a narrowly economic standpoint, this effort is bound to be seen as pure waste, but in the terms of the logic of social exchanges, it is a solid investment, the profits of which will appear, in the long run, in monetary or other form. Similarly, if the best measure of cultural capital is undoubtedly the amount of time devoted to acquiring it, this is because the transformation of economic capital into cultural capital presupposes an expenditure of time that is made possible by possession of economic capital. More precisely, it is because the cultural capital that is effectively transmitted within the family itself depends not only on the quantity of cultural capital, itself accumulated by spending time, that the domestic group possess, but also on the usable time (particularly in the form of the mother’s free time) available to it (by virtue of its economic capital, which enables it to purchase the time of others) to ensure the transmission of this capital and to delay entry into the labor market through prolonged schooling, a credit which pays off, if at all, only in the very long term.

The convertibility of the different types of capital is the basis of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the position occupied in social space) by means of the conversions least costly in terms of conversion work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself (in a given state of the social power of transversalization). The different types of capital can be distinguished according to their reproducibility or, more precisely, according to how easily they are transmitted, i.e., with more or less loss and with more or less concealment; the rate of loss and the degree of concealment tend to vary in inverse ratio. Everything which helps to disguise the economic aspect also tends to increase the risk of loss (particularly the inter-organizational transfer). Thus the (apparent) incomposability of the different types of capital introduces high degree of uncertainty into all transactions between holders of different types. Some, in particular, have a declared refusal of calculation and guarantees which characterizes exchanges of a capital of obligations that are usable in the short term, or less long term (exchanges of gifts, services, etc.) necessarily entails the risk of concealment; the refusal of that recognition of guaranteed debts which such exchanges produce. Similarly, too, the high degree of concealment of the transmission of cultural capital has the disadvantage (in addition to inherent risks of loss) that the cultural qualification which is its institutionalized form is neither transmissible (like a title) nor negotiable (like stocks and shares). More precisely, cultural capital, diffuse, continuous transmission within the family escapes observation and control (so that the educational system seems to guard its honors solely to natural qualities) and is therefore becoming more and more acculturated, at least on the labor market, only validated by the educational system, converted into a capital of qualifications, subject to more and more disguised but more risky transmission than economic capital. As the educational qualification, invested with the specific force of the official, becomes the condition for legitimate access to growing numbers of positions, particularly the dominant part of the educational system tends increasingly to dispose of the domestic group of the transmission of power and the legitimate heir from among children of different sex and birth rank. And economic capital, itself poses quite different obstacles of transmission, depending on the kind (1970), the liquidity of commercial capital, which gives immediate economic power and favors transmission, also makes it more vulnerable than landed property (or real estate) and does not favor the establishment of long-lasting dynasties.

Because the question of the arbitrariness of appropriation arises most clearly in this process of transmission—particular time of succession, a critical moment, every reproduction strangling a part of itself and its reproduction. When the critique which aims to weaken the class through the principle of its productive force by bringing to light the arbitrary entitlements transmitted and of the reproduction (such as the critique of Enlightenment philosophes direct name of nature, against the arbitrariness birth) is incorporated in institutional mechanisms (for example, laws of tenure) aimed at controlling the offsprings of power and the holders of capital have an even greater interest in resorting to reproduction strategies of ensuring better disguised transmission but at the cost of greater loss of control and exploiting the convertibility of the capital. Thus the more the officialization of capital is prevented or, more the more the clandestine (or in the form of cultural) become determinant in the reproduction of the social structure, an insular reproduction capable of disguising and function, the scope of the educational system tends to increase, and together with increase is the unification of the mass social qualifications which give rise to occupy rare positions.

Notes

1. This inertia, entailed by the tendency for structures of capital to reproduce themselves in institutions or in dispositional adaptations of structures of which they are the product, course, represented by a specifically political action of concerted conservation, i.e., demobilization and depoliticization, which latter tends to keep the domestic group from the transformation of a practical group, united on the one hand, by the division of their jobs, condemned to function as an agglomeration of labor, individuals, groups (such as consumers or electoral choices).

2. This is true of all exchanges between mental and material wealth and the different fractions of the dominant exploiting different types of capital. For example, from sales of expertise, treatment...
most decorous names that can be found (honorable, encomiums, etc.) to matrimonial exchanges, the prime example of a transaction that can only take place as if it is not perceived or defined as such by the contracting parties. It is remarkable that the apparent extensions of economic theory beyond the limits constituting the discipline have left intact the sacred, apotropaic status of a few sacrilegious incursions. Gary S. Becker, for example, who was one of the first to take explicit account of the types of capital that are usually ignored, never considers anything other than monetary costs and profits, forgetting that the differences in returns to different investments (inter alia, the affective ones) and the material and symbolic benefits that education provides in a deferred, indirect way, such as the added value which the dispositions produced or reinforced by schooling (bodily or verbal manners, tastes, etc.) or the relationships established with fellow students can yield in the matrimonial market (Becker 1964a).

3. Symbolic capital, that is to say, capital—in whatever form—ins so as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship that may be conscious or unconscious, the relation of recognition and recognition presupposes the intervention of the habitus, as a socially constituted cognitive capacity.

4. When talking about concepts for their own sake, as I do here, rather than using concepts in relationships, one always runs the risk of being both schematic and formal, i.e., theoretical in the most usual and most usually approved sense of the word.

5. This proposition implies no recognition of the value of scholarly work; it merely registers the relationships which exist in reality between a particular cultural capital and the laws of the educational market. Dispositions that are given a negative value in the educational market may receive very high value in other markets, and conversely, in the relationships internal to the class.

6. In a relatively undifferentiated society, in which access to the means of appropriating the cultural heritage is very equally distributed, economic culture does not fundamentally separate or differentiate societies, i.e., as a means of acquiring exclusive advantages.

7. What I call the generalized Arrow effect, i.e., the fact that all cultural goods—paintings, monuments, machines, and any objects shaped by men, particularly those which belong to the childhood environment—exert an educative effect by their mere existence, is no doubt one of the structural factors behind the ‘schooling explosion,’ in the sense that a growth in the quantity of cultural capital accumulated in the objectified state increases the educative effect automatically exerted by the environment. If one adds to this the fact that embodied cultural capital is constantly increasing, it can be seen that, in each generation, the educational system can take more for granted. The fact that the same educational investment is increasing productively is one of the structural factors of the inflation of qualitative effects, and so on, to the advantage of cultural factors linked to effects of capital conversion.

8. The cultural object, as a living social institution, is, simultaneously, a socially instituted material object and a particular class of habitus, to which it is addressed. The material object (e.g., a book, a monument, a field. It is the affective one) and the material and symbolic benefits that education provides in a deferred, indirect way, such as the added value which the dispositions produced or reinforced by schooling (bodily or verbal manners, tastes, etc.) or the relationships established with fellow students can yield in the matrimonial market (Becker 1964a).

9. The dialectical relationship between objectified cultural capital—of which the form changes is written on the objectified cultural capital has generally been received as a kind of schematic description of the degradation of the spirit by the letter, the living by the inert, creation by routine, grace by heaviness.

10. This is particularly true in France, where in many occupations (particularly the civil service) there is a very strict relationship between qualification, rank, and remuneration (translator’s note).

11. Here, too, the notion of cultural capital did not spring from pure theoretical work, still less from an empirical study of economic concepts. It arose from the need to identify the principle of social effects which, although they can be seen clearly at the level of singular agents—where statistical inquiry inevitably stops short at the level of properties individually possessed by a given agent. These effects, in which spontaneous sociology readily perceives the work of ‘connections,’ are particularly visible in all cases in which different individuals obtain very unequal profits from virtually equivalent (economic or cultural) capital, depending on the extent to which they can mobilize by proxy the capital of a group (a family, the alumni of an elite school, a club, the aristocracy, etc.) that is more or less constituted as such and more or less rich in capital.

12. Neighborhood relationships may, of course, receive an elementary form of institutionalization, as in the Jena— or the Basque region, where neighbors, low bourgeoisie, lower class (which, in old texts, is applied to the legitimate inhabitants of the village, the rightful members of the assembly), are explicitly designated, in accordance with fairly codified rules, and are ranked according to their rank (there is a first neighbor, a second neighbor, and so on). In the obvious case, the situations actually used by no means always coincide with the relationships socially institutionalized.

13. Manners (bearing, pronunciation, etc.) may be included in social capital insofar as, through the mode of acquisition they point to, they indicate initial membership of a more or less prestigious group.

14. National liberation movements or nationalist ideologies cannot be accounted for solely by reference to strictly economic profits, i.e., the profits which may be derived from redistribution of a proportion of wealth among the majority of the people (nationalization) and the recovery of highly paid jobs (see Breton 1964). To these specifically economic anticipated profits, which would only explain the nationalism of the privileged classes, must be added the very real and immediate profits deriving from the possession of social capital, which are proportionately greater for those who lower down the social hierarchy (‘poor whites’), or more precisely, more threatened by economic and social policies in the press.

15. There is every reason to suppose that socializing, or, more generally, relational, dispositional media are very unequally distributed among the social classes and, within a given class, among fractions of different origin.

16. ‘A little more and you speak,’ (translator).

17. It goes without saying that social capital is so totally governed by the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment that it always functions as symbolic capital.

18. It is therefore easy to dispel a likely misunderstanding, that the investment in question here is not necessarily conceived as a calculated pursuit of gain, but that it has every likelihood of being experienced in terms of the logic of emotional investment, i.e., as an involvement which is both necessary and disinterested. This has not always been appreciated by historians, who, even when they are as alert to symbolic effects as E. P. Thompson tend to conceive symbolic practices—powered wigs and the whole paraphernalia of office—as explicit strategies of domination, intended to be seen (from below), pretentious or charitable complacency acts of class appeasement.

19. Macdonald’s (1974) theory that slightly disinterested acts being corresponding to objective interests of fields, particularly those that tend to deny interest and every significant act that is disinterested, are not to grant full recognition, and with creation which guarantees those who distinguish themselves immediate conformity of their token of sincerity and attachment to the regime which is obviously erroneous to describe the habitus which lead artists researcher toward his national style, manner, etc.) in terms of exigency and cynical calculation. To the extent that, for example, style, genre, school, or specialty at a religious conversions that are per se sincerity, can be understood as versions, the direction and more (on which their success often depends) of the men who are the less likely to be seen as so skilled it is, Innocence is the privilege who move in their field of activity.

20. To understand the attractiveness antagonistic positions which is other’s alibi, one would need to be conscious of unconscious or the protosiociousness which they procure trials. While some find in economic capital, in the future, the rich: which place them on the side of others can abandon the destitute the economic, they are completely capable of these symbols which are evaluated and valued by virtue of their symbolic (the latter) merely in symbolic real of the symbolic, the strata, the intellectuals and artists endeavor the recognition of their value value, the same authority law of the on which what one or which completely defines what one is one is as is shown by the practice with, techniques such as the administration of credit, tend to be subordinated to loans and the fixing of interest rate, exhaustive inquiry into the born and future resources.)

21. Among the advantages procurers all its types, the most precious is the volume of time that is through the various methods of
other people's time (in the form of services). It may take the form either of increased spare time, secured by reducing the time consumed in activities directly channeled toward producing the means of reproducing the existence of the domestic group, or of more intense use of the time so consumed, by recourse to other people's labor or to devices and methods which are available only to those who have spent time learning how to use them and which (like better transport or living close to the place of work) make it possible to save time. (This is in contrast to the cash savings of the poor, which are paid for in time—do-it-yourself, bargain hunting, etc.) None of this is true of more economic capital; it is possession of cultural capital that makes it possible to derive greater profit not only from labor-time, but securing a higher yield from the same time, but also from spare time, and so to increase both economic and cultural capital.

It goes without saying that the dominant fractions, who tend to place even greater emphasis on educational investment, within an overall strategy of asset diversification and of investments aimed at combining security with high yield, have all sorts of ways of evading scholastic verdicts. The direct transmission of economic capital remains one of the principal means of production, and the effect of social capital ('a helping hand', 'string-pulling', the 'old boy network') tends to correct the effect of educational qualifications, never function perfectly as currency. They are never entirely separable from their holders: their value rises in proportion to the value of their bearer, especially in the least rigid areas of the social structure.

References


I shall examine some of the assumptions and the cultural context of a particular form of preschool/infant school pedagogy, a form which has at least the following characteris-

1. Where the control of the teacher over the child is implicit rather than explicit.

2. Where, ideally, the teacher arranges the context which the child is expected to re-

3. Where within this arranged context, the child apparently has wide powers over what he selects, over how he structures, and over the time scale of his activities.

4. Where the child apparently regulates his own movements and social relationships.

5. Where there is a reduced emphasis upon the transmission and acquisition of specific skills (see Note 1).

6. Where the criteria for evaluating the pedagogy are multiple and diffuse and so not easily measured.

Invisible Pedagogy and Infant Education

One can characterise this pedagogy as an invisible pedagogy. In terms of the concepts of classification and frame, the pedagogy is realised through weak classification and weak frames. Visible pedagogies are realised through strong classification and strong frames. The basic difference between visible and invisible pedagogies is in the manner in which criteria are transmitted and in the degree of specificity of the criteria. The more implicit the manner of transmission and the more diffuse the criteria the more invisible pedagogy; the more specific the criteria the more explicit the manner of their transmis-

Basil Beri

Class and Pedagogies: Visible and Invisible

We can briefly note in passing a point which will be developed later. In the same way that the child's reading releases the child from the role of teacher and socialises him into the process of solitary learning of an explicit alphabet (i.e. the textbook), so busy children doing release the child from the role of busy teacher and socialize him into an ongoing action present in which the past is implicit (i.e. the teachers' pedagogies). Thus a non-doing child in the visible pedagogies is the equivalent of a non-reading child in the visible pedagogies (However, a non-reading child may have greater disadvantage and experience a greater difficulty than a 'non-doing' child.)

The concept basic to the invisible pedagogy...